Nutzungsbedingungen
In this paper we investigate the static competition in prices and capacities between I.S.P which face a flow of new customers who decide to belong to one I.S.P or the other on the basis of a comparison of access prices and of congestion rates that they are supposed to anticipate in a rational way.
The interesting specificity of the approach presented here is that the level of quality of the service provided by an ISP depends not only on the capacity of its network (this is the common point with the model of Gabszewicz and Thisse) but also on the number of its customers which are connected, i.e. on the deman which is addressed to him/her.
Since the latter, as we shall see below, is itself a function of the rate of congestion, there is a circular process which it will be necessary to analyze precisely
The main result result of this paper is the existence of two "miror" equilibria. In each equilibria the firm with the larger capacity sets the higher prices and is less congested than its competitor. Duopolistic equilibrium then reproduces the properties of the "Paris Metro Pricing" proposal of Odlyzko: consumer with different degrees of aversion to congestion are offered different (sub) networks: the more congestion adverse are allowed to pay more in order to benefit from a lower congestion rate. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w
The Model
There exist on the market two I.S.P each choosing a couple (price, quality), (p 1 , q 1 ) for firm 1 and (p 2 , q 2 ) for firm 2. The price is a lump sum which gives the right to the consumer to connect himself (hersel) to the network of the ISP during a given period of time. The quality q i of firm i's service is supposed equal to the ratio
being the congestion rate of firm i's network) where K i represents the capacity of firm i's network and D i is the demand to firm i ( number of users).. This assumption is selected for the sake of simplicity. The basic idea is that the users always prefer a lower rate of congestion because the congestion present on a network represents a cost (measured in units of time) for the users since it delays or slows down the sending and the reception of data. This time increases with the number of connected users and decreases with the capacity of the network.
Consumers are characterized by their type θ wich measures their preference for quality (the higher is θ, the more important is the preference for quality). They subscribe to one of both firms. We make the simplifying assumption according to which θ is distributed uniformly on the interval [ 0,1 ]. The surplus of a type θ−consumer suscribing to firm i may be written as : where u is a strictly positive parameter, the value of which is supposed very high so that at the equilibrium every user prefers to subscribe to one of the firms rather than staying out (i.e. the market is always covered). 4. in the third stage each user chooses the network to which it will be connected given to the couple of prices (p 1 , p 2 ) chosen previously by the ISPs and to the couple of rates of congestion which she/he is assumed to rationally anticipate. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w As usual the model is solved backward starting with the last stage, i.e. the determination of the demand functions. The type θ * -individual is indifferent between the two offers. All the consumers of types θ > θ * contract with the high quality firm while the consumers of types θ < θ * choose the low quality firm.
The perfect subgame equilibrium
The demand addressed to the low quality firm firm is equal to θ * . The demand addressed to the high quality firm is equal to (1 − θ * ). Straightforwardly the demand addressed to each firm depends on the expected rate of congestion . The realized rate of congestion is itself a function of the demand. The assumption of rational anticipations imposes an equality between both expected and realized rates of congestion for each I.S.P.
Let us first consider the case where firm 2 is the high quality firm
The demand addressed to firm 2 is thus :
where In the same way for firm 1
It follows that the difference between the "realized" qualities q 2− q 1 is a function of the difference between the expected qualities q a 2 − q a 1 :
Under rational expectations q a 2 − q a 1 = q 2 − q 1 and we determine the equilibrium value of q 2 − q 1 as a function of both access prices and networks capacities:
In the symmetrical case where p 1 > p 2 one obtains obviously a symmetrical formula
This is the most interesting aspect of the model: a positive difference 6 
When p 1 > p 2 the symmetrical formulas are:
It is now possible to analyze the second stage equilibrium of the game.
There is at this level of the play a Nash equilibrium in price between the Internet Service Providers. When p 2 > p 1 ,the respective profits of both firms are: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w
We obtains symmetrical formulas for p 1 > p 2 :
For the sake of simplicity we shall now assume that C(K i ) = 0.5 * K 2 i .
Deriving π 2 with respect to p 2 one obtains
Let us notice moreover that, for p 1 > p 2 we have
Lemma 1:
1. The best reply correspondence of firm 2 is: 8 
).
2.
The best reply correspondence of firm 1 is as follows:
Lemma 2: For any couple of networks capacities (
there exists a unique second-stage Nash equilibrium between the Internet Access Providers which is such that:
9
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Taking into account Lemma 2, the profits of firm 2 are
and symmetrically for firm 1.
Lemma 3:
1. The reaction function of firm 2 is as follows: 2. The reaction function of firm 1 is exactly symmetrical.
Proof: For a given K 1 there are two values of K 2 corresponding potentially to a local maximum of the profit π 2 :
can be a solution only for K 1 ≤ 1 In the same way
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Proof: See previous Lemmas.
There is thus at the equilibrium a vertical differentiation which is established in an endogenous way between the Internet Service Providers:
the firm which provides the larger network has the lowest rate of congestion and the highest access price ... It is interesting to notice that the corresponding equilibrium profits are 0.560435 for the I.S.P providing the smallest network (thus the most congested) and 0.5 for the I.S.P providing the largest network (thus the least congested). There is in the game studied here a first-mover' advantage: since there are two symmetrical equilibria each Provider prefers being the one which provides the smallest network and makes the highest profit. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
